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Inflation  adjusted  government  budget  deficits  and 
their  impact  on  the  business  cycle: 
empirical  evidence  for  8  industrial  countries 
In  a  recent  paper  on  the  effect  of  Federal  Budget  Deficits  published  in 
the  American  Economic  Review,  Robert  Eisner  and  Paul  Pieper  (1984)  have 
shown  that  the  inflation  adjusted  high  employment  surplus  explains  a 
significantly  higher  proportion  of  the  variance  of  US  real  output  growth 
and  unemployment  changes  than  the  non-adjusted  high  employment  surplus.  In 
a  later  study  (1986)  they  extended  their  analysis  to  six  other  industrial 
countries  using  inflation  adjusted  and  unadjusted  high  employment  surpluses 
calculated  by  Cukierman  and  Mortensen  (1983).  They  found  that  their 
previous  result  reached  for  the  United  States  is  confirmed  for  most 
countries.  In  addition  they  found  that  in  explaining  real  GOP  growth  for 
countries  other  than  the  US,  the  US  inflation  adjusted  high  employment 
budget  surplus  has  a  greater  explanatory  power  than  the  country's  own 
adjusted  high  employment  surplus. 
There  are  three  major  problems  with  Eisner  and  Pieper's  study.  First 
they  use  reduced  form  equations.  It  follows  that  their  estimated 
coefficients  are  subject  to  the  likelihood  of  a  simultaneous  equations  bias 
which  is  larger  the  more  effective  policy  makers  are  in  stabilizing  the 
business  cycle.  The  effect  of  economic  policy  on  the  business  cycle  should 
therefore  be  estimated  within  the  context  of  a  model  containing  also 
reaction  functions  of  fiscal  authorities.  The  use  of  the  high  employment 
budget  surplus  as  a  measure  of  the  fiscal  policy  rather  than  the  cyclically 
unadjusted  surplus  may  reduce  this  bias  somewhat,  but  is  unlikely  to 
eliminate  it.  Second,  their  reduced  forms  include  only  the  lagged  high 
employment  budget  surplus  as  explanatory  variable,  neglecting  other  factors 
which  could  affect  the  business  cycle,  mostly  monetary  policy  and  supply 
side  shocks.  Thus  the  regression  coefficients  they  estimate  could  also  be 
biased  owing  to  a  mis-specification  of  the  output  equation.  Michael  Bruno 
(1984)  has  shown  in  pooled  cross-country  regressions  for  7  industrial 
countries  that  lagged  changes  in  the  terms  of  trade  and  lagged  changes  in -2-
domestic  and  US  real  money  growth  contribute  significantly  to  explain 
changes  in  real  aggregate  GOP.  In  previous  pooled  regression  analysis 
explaining  changes  in  real  manufacturing  output  he  showed  that  lagged 
changes  in  real  wages,  in  the  real  money  stock,  in  the  ratio  of  import  to 
consumer  prices  and  in  the  lagged  change  in  the  share  of  the  government 
deficit  to  GOP  are  important  explanatory  variables  (Bruno,  1980). 
Third,  Eisner  and  Pieper  use  the  high  employment  surplus  expressed 
as  a  ratio  to  GNP  to  explain  the  rate  of  change  of  real  GNP,  as  if a  higher 
surplus  entailed  a  permanently  higher  rate  of  growth  of  real  GNP.  They 
implicitly  assume,  following  Modigliani 's  life-cycle  hypothesis  and 
Friedman's  permanent  income  theory,  that  real  private  consumption  depends 
on  the  level  of  real  wealth,  of  which  public  debt  is  a  component.  As  a 
result  they  relate  the  rate  of  change  of  real  GNP  to  the  first  difference 
of  public  debt  i.e.  to  the  level  of  the  government  budget  deficit.  But 
there  are  several  problems  with  the  use  of  the  high  employment  surplus  as  a 
proxy  for  changes  in  wealth.  First  public  debt  is  only  one  component  of 
wealth.  Second  the  high  employment  surplus  is  a  hypothetical  construct 
that  does  not  necessarily  bear  a  close  relationship  to  changes  in  the 
actual  stock  of  public  debt.  For  instance  in  the  case  of  a  prolonged 
depression  it  is  possible  that  the  high  employment  budget  is  slightly  in 
deficit  or  even  shows  a  surplus, 
real  stock  of  public  debt  is 
while  the  actual  deficit  is  large  and  the 
rising  sharply.  This  consideration  casts 
doubts  on  the  meaning  of  the  cyclical  adjustment  of  the  surplus.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  inflation  adjustment  is  applied  to  the  actual  stock  of 
public  debt,  so  that  the  inflation  adjusted  high  employment  surplus  is  to  a 
large  extent  a  "hybrid"  concept.  Third,  wealth  holders  may  also  be 
influenced  by  their  current  income  and  low  income  groups  are  certainly 
income  constrained.  In  this  case  consumption  will  be  a  function  of  income 
also.  The  level  of  government  expenditure,especially  transfers,  and  of 
taxation  influence  household  disposable  income  and  government  expenditures 
on  goods  and  services  is  a  direct  component  of  aggregate  demand.  Under 
these  keynesian  assumptions  the  rate  of  change  in  GNP  becomes  a  function  of 
the  first  difference  of  the  government  budget  surplus.  The  latter 
specification  of  the  output  equation  is  used  by  Bruno  (1980).  In  this 
paper  both  the  level  and  the  first  difference  of  the  government  budget 
surplus  are  introduced  as  explanatory  variables  in  the  output  equations. This 
validity 
inflation 
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paper  has  three  main  objectives. 
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equations  in  which  the  real  money  stock,  real  wages  and  the  real  price  of 
oil  are  used  as  explanatory  variables  along  with  the  inflation  adjusted  or 
unadjusted  surplus.  Secondly,  to  estimate  similar  output  equations  also 
for  7  other  industrial  countries  to  check  the  robustness  of  Eisner  and 
Pieper's  main  conclusion  for  other  industrial  countries  and  to  check 
whether  there  is  a  systematic  relationship  between  the  size  of  the  country 
and  the  relative  importance  of  domestic  versus  foreign  variables  in 
determining  the  business  cycle.  Third,  to  analyze  the  sensitivity  of 
Eisner  and  Pieper's  main  conclusion  to  the  choice  of  the  sample  period  and 
to  the  introduction  of  the  first  difference  of  the  full  employment  budget 
su~plus  in  addition  to  its  level  as  a  separate  regressor. 
In  extending  Eisner  and  Pieper's  analysis  in  this  way  only  the  second 
and  the  third  problem  of  their  empirical  work  is  dealt  with  in  this  paper. 
There  was  also  no  attempt  to  eliminate  the  simultaneous  equation  bias.  To 
try  and  do  so  would  have  taken  us  too  far  from  their  starting  framework  and 
would  have  made  the  analysis  for  a  large  number  of  countries  very 
cumbersome.  For  this  reason  the  results  of  this  paper  have  to  be 
interpreted  with  some  caution.  The  coefficients  of  foreign  policy 
variables  are,  however,  likely  to  be  subject  to  a  smaller  simultaneous 
equation  bias,  as  economic  policy  choices  in  large  countries  are  not 
generally  believed  to  depend  significantly  on  the  business  cycle  in  smaller 
countries. 
There  are  three  main  conclusions  derived  from  the  empirical  evidence 
presented  in  this  paper.  First  the  inflation  adjusted  full  employment 
surplus  does  not  unambiguously  possess  a  greater  explanatory  power  than  the 
non  adjusted  one,  contradicting  Eisner  and  Pieper's  main  finding.  Second, 
the  evidence  in  favour  of  a  positive  short  run  effect  of  domestic  fiscal 
expansion  on  domestic  real  output  is  strong  only  for  the  US  and  Japan.  For 
all  medium  and  small  sized  countries  there  is  instead  some  evidence  of  more 
than  full  crowding  out  of  domestic  fiscal  expansion  and  strong  evidence -4-
that  fiscal  expansion  in  large  countries  leads  to  a  contraction  in  output 
in  small  and  medium  sized  ones.  Third,  the  smaller  the  country,  the  more 
foreign  fiscal  and  monetary  policy  variables  dominate  the  domestic  business 
cycle  with  respect  to  domestic  ones. 
The  sample  includes  8  industrial  countries,  the  US,  Japan,  Germany,  the 
UK,  France,  Italy,  the  Netherlands  and  Denmark.  The  structure  of  the  paper 
is  as  follows:  Section  1  explains  how  the  estimated  equation  is  derived 
from  a  short  run  aggregate  demand  and  aggregate  supply  framework  following 
Bruno  (1984)  and  summarizes  the  main  problems  raised  in  literature  with  the 
inflation  adjustment  of  budget  deficits.  Section  2  presents  empirical 
tests  of  the  output  equation  for  the  US.  The  sample  period  is  1967-1981  as 
in  Eisner  and  Pieper  (1984a).  In  Section  3  additional  estimates  of  the 
output  equation  which  use  a  different  source  for  the  cyclically  and 
inflation  adjusted  budget  surplus  (Mortensen  1985)  are  presentd  for  the  US 
and  for  7  other  industrial  countries. 
findings  and  concluding  comments. 
Section  4  contains  a  summary  of  the 
1.  The  derivation  of  the  short  run  output  equation  and  the  rationale  for 
the  inflation  adjustment  of  public  sector  deficits. 
In  standard  textbook  models  of  aggregate  demand  and  aggregate  supply, 
output  is  determined  in  the  short  run  in  the  aggregate  output-aggregate 
price  level  plane  at  the  intersection  of  the  two  curves  of  aggregate  demand 
and  aggregat  supply.  Aggregate  supply  is  a  marginal  short  run  cost  curve 
schedule  which  is  upward  sloping,  implying  rising  marginal  costs  as  output 
increases.  At  low  levels  of  output  the  curve  is  generally  assumed  to  be 
relatively  flat  because  of  under-utilisation  of  resources  while  at  high 
levels  of  output  its  slope  is  generally  assumed  to  be  steeper.  An  increase 
in  the  cost  of  raw  materials  shifts  the  supply  curve  to  the  left.  So  does 
an  increase  in  wages,  thus  tending  to  reduce  output  for  a  given  demand. 
The  downward  sloping  aggregate  demand  schedule  is  influenced  by 
monetary  and  fiscal  policy,  but  also  by  the  wage  rate.  An  increase  in  the 
money  supply  shifts  the  demand  curve  outwards  and  increases  output.  So [2) 
-5-
does  an  increase  in  the  government  budget  deficit.  The  real  wage  rate  has 
uncertain  effects  on  the  demand  curve.  An  increase  in  real  wages  leads  to 
an  increase  in  consumption  by  wage  earners,  but  it  tends  to  reduce  profits 
at  the  same  time.  Only  if  the  spending  propensity  out  of  wage  income  is 
higher  than  that  out  of  profit  income,  will  the  demand  curve  shift  to  the 
right  thus  tending  to  increase  output.  Using  the  same  symbols  as  in  Bruno 
(1984)  the  output  equation  derived  from  the  aggregate  demand-aggregate 
supply  model  is: 
( 1 )  y 
•  y  = rate  of  change  of  real  GOP/GNP 
OF  = cyclically  adjusted  public  sector  surplus  expressed  in 
percentage  of  GOP •  . 
m  = rate  of  change  of  the  real  monetary  base  . 
poil  = rate  of  change  of  the  domestic  currency  price  of  oil  deflated  by 
the  domestic  consumer  price  index 
•  w  = rate  of  change  of  the  gross  compensation  of  employees  deflated 
by  the  GNP/GOP  deflator 
= first  difference  of  a  variable. 
Since,  especially  for  small  countries,  fore i g:n  influences  are 
important,  also  the  rate  of  change  of  the  foreign  real  monetary  base  (mf) 
and  the  aggregated  foreign  cyclically  adjusted  public  sector  surplus 
(OFf)  have  been  added  as  explanatory  variable  in  the  equation.  Foreign 
influences  could  be  measured  also  in  a  more  traditional  way  by  world 
trade.  The  former  specification  was  preferred  because  the  focus  of  this 
paper  is  on  the  effect  of  inflation  adjusted  and  non-adjusted  budget 
deficits  on  the  business  cycle.  However,  the  foreign  policy  variables  can 
be  regarded  as  determining  world  trade,  although  they  do  not  fully  explain 
it. 
(2)  y  = ao+a10F+a~OF+a3m+a4Poil+a5~ 
a6oFf  +  a~OFf +  aa~f -6-
where  the  foreign  variables  are  obtained  by  calculating  the  GOP  weighted 
average  of  the  US,  Japanese  and  German  monetary  base  or  cyclically  adjusted 
budget  surplus.  For  the  latter  three  countries  the  foreign  variables  are 
calculated  as  the  GOP  weighted  average  of  the  other  two.  Appendix  2 
contains  a  description  of  the  data  used  and  the  sources. 
The  expected  signs  of  the  coefficients  are: 
a 8  ~o 
~0 
and  the  coefficients  of  the  fiscal  variables  a1,a2,a6  and  a7  are 
expected  to  be  negative  if  a  fiscal  expansion  stimulates  aggregate  demand, 
and  positive if a  fiscal  expansion  leads  to  more  than  full  crowding-out  of 
private  expenditure.  The  inclusion  in  the  equation  of  the  budget  surplus 
and  its  first  difference  should  shed  light  on  the  relative  importance  of 
the  channels  of  transmission  of  fiscal  policy:  the  wealth  effect  on 
consumption  or 
of  as  is  also 
the  simple  keynesian  multiplier  effect.  The  expected  sign 
ambiguous  for  the  reasons  explained  above.  In  general  one 
would  expect  domestic  policy  variables  to  matter  relatively  more  for  large 
countries  than  for  small  ones.  For  the  latter  the  coefficients  a1,  to 
a3  could  well  tend  to  zero  due  to  the  openness  of  their  economies  and  the 
rapid  balance  of  payments  effects  of  domestic  policies. 
The  coefficients  of  foreign  policy  variables  are  expected  instead  to  tend 
towards  zero  for  large  countries  and  be  significantly  different  from  zero 
for  small  ones.  This  follows  simply  from  the  different  impact  of  large  and 
small  countries  on  the  world  business  cycle. 
The  channels  through  which  fiscal  and  monetary  variables  in  large 
countries  can  influence  GOP  in  small  ones  are  manifold  and  depend  on  the 
exchange  rate  regime.  Expansionary  policies  in  large  countries  influence 
domestic  aggregate  demand  and  this  in  turn  influences  foreign  aggregate 
demand  via  the  foreign  trade  multiplier.  Under  the  assumption  of  integrated 
capital  markets  an  increase  in  real  interest  rates  in  large  countries  is -7-
transmitted  abroad.  For  instance  in  the  case  of  the  US  fiscal  monetary 
policy  mix  from  1982  to  1985,  foreign  output  growth  was  influenced 
positively  via  the  foreign  trade  multiplier,  while  the  increased  level  of 
world  real  interest  rates  reduced  aggregate  demand  outside  the  United 
States.  Other  effects  were  at  work  as  well:  the  depreciation  of  the 
European  currencies  and  of  the  yen  led  to  a  negative  term  of  trade  effect 
in  Europe  and  Japan  while  the  increased  competitiveness  of  European  and 
Japanese  goods  reinforced  the  positive  foreign  trade  multiplier  effect. 
The  depreciation  of  European  currencies  and  of  the  yen,  the  larger  current 
account  surpluses  and  the  higher  interest  rates  also  influenced  the 
development  of  European  and  Japanese  wealth  and  in  turn  consumption  (in  an 
ambiguous  way).  Since  these  effects  do  not  all  work  in  the  sale 
direction,  it  is  not  possible  to  establish  on  theoretical  grounds  the  sign 
of  the  effect  of  fiscal  expansion  in  larger  ~ountries  or  real  GOP  in 
smaller  ones.  In  principle  one  should  construct  a  full  scale  macroeconomic 
model  of  the  world  economy  incorporating  all  the  effects  mentioned  above. 
However,  this  would  take  us  much  beyond  the  scope  of  this  paper. 
Two  definitions  of  the  cyclically  adjusted  government  budget  surplus 
were  used:  the  cyclical  and  non-inflation  adjusted  one  (OF1),  the 
cyclical  and  inflation  adjusted  one  (OF2).  The  methodology  used  to 
calculate  these  budget  balances  and  the  rationale  behind  the  corrections  is 
explained  in  Eisner  and  Pieper  (1984)  and  in  Cukierman  and  Mortensen 
(1983).  In  Section  2  the  test  of  equation  (1)  for  the  United  States  uses 
the  data  published  by  Eisner  and  Pieper  (1984)  to  facilitate  comparisons. 
They  use  the  concept  of  the  high  employment  budget  surplus,  while  the 
cyclical  adjustment  of  the  fiscal  balances  done  by  Cukierman  and  Mortensen 
is  made  in  a  more  rudimentary  fashion  by  calculating  full  employment  total 
tax  revenues  and  total  expenditure  on  the  basis  of  deviations  of  GOP  from 
trend.  Rather  than  comparing  regressions  which  contain  alternatively  OF1 
and  OF2,  an  alternative  way  to  test  for  the  relevance  of -the  inflation 
adjustment  of  the  surplus  is  to  introduce  in  the  same  equation  both  OF2  and 
the  inflation  adjustment  itself  as  separate  regressors.  The  latter  method 
does  not  retrict  a  priori  the  coefficient  of  the  inflation  adjustment  to  be 
either  zero  or  equal  to  the  coefficient  of  OF2.  However,  introduction  of 
the  inflation  adjustments  as  separate  regressors  (in  level  and  first 
difference,  domestic  and  foreign)  would  greatly  limit  the  numbers  of  degree -8-
of  freedom  and  would  be  virtually  impossible  in  the  individual  country 
regressions. 
Eisner  and  Pieper  and  Cukierman  and  Mortensen  believe  that  inflation 
distorts  the  published  public  sector  balances  because  as  inflation  and 
nominal  interest  rates  rise  so  do  nominal  interest  payments  on  the  public 
debt.  These  payments  do  not  represent  a  genuine  increase  in  disposable 
income  of  households;  they  only  compensate  households  for  the  capital 
losses  on  the  government  bonds  they  hold.  Thus,  according  to  them, 
inflation  artificially  raises  government  deficits,  measured  disposable 
income  and  measured  household  saving.  While  it  cannot  be  denied  that 
inflation  distorts  national  accounts,  it  is  extremely  difficult  to  correct 
the  published  sector  balances  in  a  fully  satisfactory  way.  First,  the 
method  used  by  the  above  authors  to  adjust  public  sector  balances  for 
inflation  presupposes  that  individuals  are  totally  free  from  money 
illusion,  i.e.  that  they  are  able  to  distinguish  fully  between  real 
interest  income  and  interest  income  compensating  them  for  the  erosion  of 
the  real  value  of  the  stock  of  government  bonds  they  hold.  It  is  unlikely 
that  individuals  are  totally  free  of  money  illusion.  The  degree  to  which 
individuals  are  subject  to  money  illusion  can  vary  through  time  and  across 
countries.  In  particular,  it  is  probably  also,  a  function  of  the  history 
of  inflation  in  the  country.  In  addition  the  institutionalization  and 
professionalization  of  the  savings  process  which  is  being  observed  in  many 
countries  is  likely  to  have  reduced  in  time  the  degree  of  money  illusion. 
Another  way  to  look  at  this  problem  is  by  distinguishing  between  current 
and  expected  changes  in  inflation.  Individuals  are  likely  to  react  to  the 
change  in  the  real  value  of  the  debt  they  anticipate  for  the  future  in 
addition  to  the  change  they  are  experiencing  at  present.  Individuals  may 
react  in  only  a  small  degree  to  a  short  run  increase  in  prices  that  is  not 
expected  to  continue.  A  small  reaction  to  an  increase  in  prices  which  is 
not  expected  to  continue  does  not  necessarily  imply  "money  illusion".  But 
as  inflation  develops  and  people  become  accustomed  to  it  and  expect  it  to 
continue  it  would  appear  implausible  for  individuals  not  to  react  to  the 
increase  in  the  price  level.  Miller  (1985)  showed  that  the  appropriate 
inflation  adjustment  depends  on  the  preferred  income  concept.  If  the 
current  income  concept  is  preferred  then  the  rate  of  inflation  expected  to 
prevail  in  the  short  run  should  be  used  for  the  correction,  if  the -9-
permanent  income  concept  is  preferred,  then  the  long  run  expected  inflation 
should  be  used.  Owing  to  the  difficulties  of  satisfactorily  measuring 
expectations  of  inflation  and  agreeing  on  the  proper  income  concept  any 
attempt  to  calculate  a  real  fiscal  deficit  could  be  misleading.  Second, 
there  are  problems  with  the  data  on  government  debt  net  of  holdings  of 
government  assets  in  virtually  every  country,  not  to  mention  the  amount  of 
government  bonds  held  by  households. 
For  the  above  reasons  great  care  is  needed  in  pointing  out  the  limits 
of  the  inflation  corrections  of  the  deficits  whenever  they  are  used.  Also 
important  is  to  specify  clearly  the  purpose  of  the  analysis  for  which  the 
inflation  correction  is  made.  As  Buiter  has  put  it:  "To  determine  the 
significance  of  the  behaviour  of  public  debt  and  deficits,  we  must  get  away 
from  the  dangerous  short-cuts  of  'model  free'  single  figure  indeces  of 
fiscal  stance"  (Buiter,  1985). 
2.  Estimates  of  output  equations  for  the  US  and  the  high  employment  budget 
surplus:  a  comment  to  Eisner  and  Pieper. 
Estimates  of  the  output  equation  (2)  for  the  United  States  are 
contained  in  Table  1.  The  measures  of  the  degree  of  restrictiveness  of 
fiscal  policy  used  are  the  high  employment  budget  surplus  and  the  inflation 
adjusted  high  employment  budget  surplus  as  published  by  Eisner  and  Pieper 
(1984a).  The  sample  period  is  1967-81  as  in  Eisner  and  Pieper  and  the  data 
used  is  annual.  The  first  two  regressions  of  the  table  are  reproduced  from 
their  study.  They  include  only  the  full  employment  surplus  as  a  ratio  to 
GNP  as  explanatory  variable.  From  the  two  regressions  they  infer  first 
that  an  expansionary  fiscal  policy  affects  economic  activity  positively 
with  a  one  year  lag  and  secondly  that  the  inflation  adjusted  surplus 
explains  a  higher  fraction  of  the  variance  of  output.  They  conclude  that 
the  inflation  adjusted  full  employment  surplus  is  a  superior  measure  of  the 
degree  of  fiscal  stance.  Regressions  (3)  and  (4)  duplicate  Eisner  and 
Pieper's  estimates  of  the  output  equation.  They  confirm  their  findings. T
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Regressions  (5)  and  (6)  also  include  the  first  difference  of  the  budget 
surplus,  the  rate  of  change  of  the  real  compensation  of  employees  lagged  by 
one  year  and  of  the  real  price  of  oil,  reflecting  oil  supply  shocks  and  a 
dummy  variable  for  the  years  1968  and  1969,  during  which  US  monetary  policy 
was  restrictive.  The  coefficient  of  this  dummy  variable  is  very 
significantly  negative,  while  the  coefficient  of  the  rate  of  change  of  the 
real  monetary  base,  was  never  statistically  significant.1)  The  coefficient 
of  the  rate  of  change  of  real  wages  has  a  positive  sign  while  that  of  the 
real  price  of  oil  is  statistically  significant  and  has  the  expected 
negative  sign.  The  explanatory  power  of  regression  (6),  which  uses  the 
inflation  adjusted  budget  surplus  as  a  regressor  is  lower,  contracting 
Eisner  and  Pieper's  conclusion  that  the  inflation  adjusted  high  employment 
budget  surplus  has  a  higher  explanatory  than  the  non-inflation  adjusted 
one.  However  the  results  presented  in  Table  1  confirm  Eisner  and  Pieper's 
finding  that  an  expansionary  fiscal  policy  leads  to  a  higher  rate  of  growth 
of  output2).  It  is  interesting  to  observe  that  the  negative  coefficient  of 
DF(-1)  implies  a  positive  wealth  effect  of  increased  public  debts  a  la 
Keynes,  while  the  positive  coefficient  of  A  DF,  reflecting  the  more 
Keynesian  income  effect,  implies  more  than  full  crowding  out. 
Summarising  the  main  conclusions  that  can  be  drawn  from  Table  one 
observes  first  that  there  are  relevant  variables  determining  short  run 
output  fluctuations  such  as  lagged  real  wages  and  the  real  price  of  oil 
which  have  been  neglected  by  Eisner  and  Pieper.  Secondly,  the  exclusion  of 
these  variables  from  the  output  equation  led  Eisner  and  Pieper  to  the 
unwarranted  conclusion  that  the  inflation  adjusted  surplus  is  more  relevant 
than  the  non-inflation  adjusted  surplus  to  explain  the  business  cycle. 
Regressions  such  as  (3)  to  (6)  performed  for  the  period  1971  to  1981 
(not  shown  here)  do  not  change  the  above  conclusions.  In  the  next  section 
the  analysis  will  be  extended  to  other  industrial  countries,  the  sample 
period  will  be  extended  to  1984  and  Cukierman's  and  Mortensen's  corrections 
of  budg-e-t  s-u-rpluses- for--me  cycle  and  for  inflation  will  be  used. -12-
3.  Cyclically-adjusted  budget  balances  and  output  equations  in 
8  industrial  countries. 
A.  Large  countries 
Table  2  contains  estimates  of  output  equations  for  the  US,  Japan  and 
Germany.  The  data  used  is  annual  and  the  sample  period  is  1973-1984.  The 
source  of  the  inflation  adjusted  and  non-adjusted  budget  balances  is 
Mortensen  (1985).  The  inflation  adjustment  is  made  on  the  basis  of  the 
depreciation  of  the  net  debt.  The  precise  methodology  used  is  described  in 
Cukierman  and  Mortensen  (1983)  and  Mortensen  (1985).  The  budget  balances 
are  available  since  1971,  but  two  years  are  lost  because  of  differentiation 
and  lagging  by  one  year.  The  main  difference  with•the  US  budget  balances 
used  in  the  previous  section  is  that  here  the  cyclical  adjustment  is 
performed  at  the  level  of  the  overall  receipts  and  expenditures  on  the 
basis  of  deviations  from  trend  of  real  output. 
Looking  first  at  the  results  for  the  US  a  dummy  variable  082  has  been 
added  among  the  regressors.  It  reflects  the  degree  of  restrictiveness  of 
US  monetary  policy  in  that  year.  Neither  the  change  in  the  definition  of 
the  budget  balance  with  respect  to  Section  2  nor  the  change  in  the  sample 
period  change  the  fundamental  conclusions  reached  in  the  previous  section 
that  the  inflation  adjusted  surplus  does  not  explain  a  higher  fraction  of 
the  variance  of  real  GOP  growth.  For  Japan,  as  for  all  countries  in  this 
sample  other  than  the  US,  the  coefficient  of  the  changes  in  the  real  price 
of  oil  is  not  significantly  different  from  zero.  While  somewhat 
surprising,  this  result  may  be  due  to  the  fact  that  nominal  oil  prices  are 
more  rigid  abroad  than  in  the  US,  both  for  final  consumers  and  for 
industry,  as  the  governments  are  slow  in  changing  administred  prices.  In 
this  case  changes  in  the  import  price  of  oil  are  also  often  reflected  in 
the  budget  deficits.  Another  reason  may  be  related  to  the  fact  that  a 
larger  fraction  of  Japanese  oil  was  imported  under  long  term  contracts  and 
that  the r e fore  the  neg at  i v e  effect  s  9 f  _t__be  _o i 1  shocks  were  spread  over  more 
years.  A  fiscal  expansion  has  significantly  positive  output  effects  in 
Japan.  So  do  lagged  real  wage  increases.  No  systematic  and  significant 
influence  of  foreign  policy  variables  could  be  detected,  despite  the  fact T
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that  the  sample  period  includes  the  years  1982-84  when  US  fiscal  policy  was 
quite  expansionary.  The  US  fiscal  expansion  of  those  years  was,  however, 
partly  compensated  by  Germany's  fiscal  contraction.  The  dummy  078  for  1978 
has  a  significantly  negative  coefficient,  and  reflects  the  contractionary 
effect  on  Japanese  GOP  of  the  sharp  appreciation  of  the  Yen  which  occurred 
in  that  year.  In  Germany  the  domestic  budget  surplus  has  no  systematic 
effects  on  output  whether  it  is  introduced  as  first  difference  or  in  level 
form  while  monetary  policy  is  a  very  powerful  instrument.  As  for  Japan  the 
foreign  budget  has  no  systematic  effects  on  German  output.  However,  a 
dummy  for  1976,  which  reflects  the  general  recovery  abroad  from  the  first 
oil  shock,  has  a  significant  and  positive  ceofficient.  As  for  the  US  and 
Japan  the  inflation  adjusted  surplus  does  not  explain  a  higher  fraction  of 
the  variance  of  real  output  growth  and  foreign  policy  variables  have  no 
influence. 
The  regressions  in  Table  2  have  6  or  7  degrees  of  freedom  only.  For 
this  reason  the  data  for  the  US,  Japan  and  Germany  have  been  pooled  in 
Table  3.  The  main  conclusions  of  Table  2  remain  unchallenged  except  that 
now  the  regression  whith  the  inflation  corrected  budget  surplus  has  a 
slightly  higher  explanatory  power,  as  found  by  Eisner  and  Pieper.  Monetary 
policy,  the  real  price  of  oil  and  lagged  real  wages  have  coefficients  which 
are  very  significantly  different 
domestic  fiscal  expansion  has 
business cycle. 
from  zero,  with  the  expected  signs  and  a 
a  significantly  positive  effect  on  the 
B.  Medium  and  small  sized  countries 
Table  4  contains  pooled  estimates  of  equation  (2)  for  a  group  of  5 
small  and  medium  sized  countries:  the  UK,  France,  Italy,  the  Netherlands 
and  Denmark.  The  grouping  of  countries  in  large  and  medium  sized  is 
somewhat  arbitrary.  While  the  US  and  Japan  are  clearly  much  bigger  in 
terms  of  GOP  weights  than  the  UK,  France  and  Italy  this  is  not  so  for 
~ermany  which  could  be  equally  well  included  in  the  group  of  medium  sized 
countries.  However  owing  to  its  very  open  capital  markets  during  virtually 
the  whole  sample  period  and  to  its  dominant  economic  role  in  Europe  it  was 
preferred  not  to  include  it  among  the  latter  group.  The  data  is  annual  and T
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the  sample  period  is  1973-1984.  The  coefficients  of  the  domestic  real 
price  of  oil,  of  domestic  money  and  of  the  real  wage  rate  are  not 
significantly  different  from  zero.  An  insignificant  coefficient  of 
domestic  monetary  growth  is  to  be  expected  for  small  and  medium  sized 
countries,  if  under  flexible  exchange  rates,  a  monetary  expansion  is 
reflected  within  the  year  on  the  exchange  rate  and  on  the  domestic  price 
level  rather  than  on  real  output.  For  instance  the  author  has  estimated 
the  reaction  pattern  of  the  exchange  rate  to  monetary  growth  in  Italy  using 
a  monetary  model  of  the  exchange  rate  and  shown  that  most  of  the  adjustment 
occurs  within  the  year  (Tullio,  1979).  As  to  changes  in  real  wages,  for 
small  and  medium  sized  countries  worsening  competitiveness  and  balance  of 
payments  problems  may  quickly  dampen  any  positive  effect  on  the  business 
cycle  resulting  from  increased  consumer  demand,  thus  reinforcing  the 
negative  supply  side  effect  of  increased  wages.  The  pooled  regressions 
presented  in  Table  4  contain  therefore  only  domestic  fiscal  variables  and 
foreign  fiscal  and  monetary  variables. 
The  regressions  show  first  that  correcting  the  budget  surplus  for 
inflation  does  not  improve  their  explanatory  power.  Second  they  show  that 
domestic  fiscal  variables  do  not  on  average  significantly  influence  the 
business  cycle.  Third  they  show  that  the  joint  fiscal  policy  of  the  US, 
Japan  and  Germany  has  a  very  high  explanatory  power  and  causes  a  fall  in 
output  in  small  and  medium  sized  countries,  while  Eisner  and  Pieper  (1986) 
found  that  a  US  fiscal  expansion  influenced  positively  the  business  cycle 
in  four  European  countries,  Canada  and  Japan.  In  a  world  of  highly 
integrated  capital  markets,  a  joint  fiscal  expansion  of  the  large  countries 
not  financed  by  money  creation  causes  an  increase  in  world  real  interest 
rates.  This  negative  effect  seems  to  outweigh  the  positive  effect  of 
higher  exports  to  the  large  countries.  Thus  the  results  presented  here 
suggest  that  the  US  fiscal  expansion  of  1982-84,  which  was  however  partly 
compensated  by  Japan  and  Germany's  fiscal  contraction,  has  led  to  a 
reduction  in  output  growth  in  small  and  medium  sized  countries.  Real  GOP 
in  the  European  Community  (12  countries)  grew  by  0.5  per  cent  in  1982,  1.2 
per  cent  in  1983  and  2.0  per  cent  in  1984;  GOP  at  constant  prices 
accelerated  instead  in  the  US  from  -2.0  per  cent  in  1982  to  3.8  per  cent 
in  1983  and  7.0  per  cent  in  1984.  Thus  the  remarkable  acceleration  of 
growth  in  the  US  was  not  accompanied  by  a  visible  acceleration  in  Europe. -18-
The  finding  of  crowding  out  of  demand  in  small  and  medium  sized  countries 
as  a  result  of  a  US  fiscal  expansion  does  not  seem  therefore  at  odds  with 
the  1982-84  experience.  Finally  the  regressions  show  that  a  monetary 
expansion  in  the  large  countries  has  instead  a  very  positive  and 
significant  influence  on  the  business  cycle  of smaller  countries. 
4.  Summary  and  conclusions 
The  regressions  presented  in  Sections  2  and  3  show  that  the  adjustment 
for  inflation  does  not  unambiguously  improve  the  predictive  power  of  output 
equations  in  the  industrial  countries  analysed  here,  contrary  to  Eisner  and 
Pieper's  conclusions.  They  also  show  that  a  contraction  of  output  occurs 
in  small  and  medium  sized  countries,  as  a  result  of  fiscal  expansion  in 
larger  countries  ("international  crowding  out").  This  also  contradicts 
Eisner  and  Pieper  as  they  found  that  the  positive  foreign  trade  multiplier 
effect  prevailed.  Furthermore  the  tests  show  that  the  business  cycle  in 
large  countries  is  only  influenced  by  domestic  policy  variables.  In 
contrast,  in  small  and  medium  sized  countries  it  is  determined  largely  by 
fiscal  and  monetary  policy  in  large  countries.  Finally  they  show  that 
domestic  monetary  policy  is  a  powerful  instrument  to  influence  the  business 
cycle  in  Japan  and  Germany.  Instead  in  smaller  countries  domestic  money 
does  not  matter,  while  foreign  money  does. 
The  results  presented  in  this  paper  have  to  be  interpreted  however, 
with  some  caution,  due  to  the  simultaneous  equations  bias  implicit  in 
reduced  form  equations  of  the  type  used.  A  more  comprehensive  empirical 
analysis  of  the  interactions  between  fiscal  and  monetary  policy  on  the  one 
hand  and  the  business  cycle  on  the  other  requires  in  the  first  place  the 
modeling  of  the  behaviour  of  fiscal  and  monetary  authorities.  In  the 
second  place  the  various  channels  of  transmission  in  the  propagation  of 
fiscal  and  monetary  policy  from  large  to  smaller  countries,  would  have  to 
be  explicitly  considered. - 19-
Appendix  - Symbols  and  Sources  of  Data  Used 
I.  Basic  Variables 
CLA  =Claims  of  Central  Bank  on  Government.  Source:  International 
Monetary  Fund,  International  Financial  Statistics,  various  issues. 
DF1  =  Budget  balance  (net  lending  or  borrowing  of  General  Government) 
cyclically  adjusted,  in  per  cent  of  GOP.  Source:  Mortensen 
(1985),  except  for  Italy  where  the  source  is  Banca  d'Italia  (1985) 
and  the  concept  of  the  deficit  used  is  the  Treasury  Financing 
Requirement.  For  Italy  DF1  is  not  cyclically  adjusted.  For  the 
US  in  Table·  1  the  high  employment  budget  surplus  as  per  cent  of 
GNP,  was  used  from  Eisner  and  Pieper  (1984a). 
DF2  =  Inflation  and  cyclically  adjusted  budget  balance,  in  per  cent  of 
GOP.  Source:  Mort ens en  ( 1985).  The  inflation  adjustment  is 
based  on  the  net  public  debt.  For  the  US  in  Table  1  the  source  is 
Eisner  and  Pieper  (1984a). 
p  =  Consumer  price  index.  Source:  International  Monetary  Fund, 
International  Financial  Statistics,  various  issues. 
p  .
1
($)=  Saudi  Arabia  Export  price  of  crude  Petroleum  in  US  $/Barrel. 
01 
Source:  International  Monetary  Fund,  International  Financial 
Statistics,  various  issues. 
M  =  Reserve  money.  Source:  International  Monetary  Fund,  International 
Financial  Statistics,  various  issues. 
XR  =  Exchange  rate  with  respect  to  the  US  Dollar. 
Source:  International  Monetary  Fund,  various  issues. 
y  =  GOP  at  constant  prices.  Sources:  same  as  Pn• 
Y  =  GOP  at  current  prices.  Sources:  same  as  Pn• 
w  =  Real  total  compensation  of  employees.  Source:  OECD  (National 
Accounts,  various  issues).  The  deflator  used  is  the  GNP/GOP 
deflator. -20-
II.  Created  variables 
Pail  =  Real  price  of  oil  expressed  in  national  currency=(Poil($)*XR)/P 
.  .  . 
m  =  M - P  =  annual  percentage  change  of  reserve  money  deflated  by  the 
rate  of  inflation  of  the  previous  year. 
II.A.  Rest  of  the  world  variables 
1.  Real  Money 
*  for  IT,  NL,  UK,  FR,  OK: 
Rest  ( •m f)  of  the  world  real  money  growth  is  the  weighted  average  of  the 
rate  of  growth  of  nominal  money  in  the  US,  Japan  and  GE  minus  the  weighted 
average  of  the  rate  of  inflation  in  those  three  countries,  lagged  one  year. 
The  weights  are  based  on  the  1975  real  GOP's  converted  into  dollars  at  the 
average  exchange  rate  for  1975 • 
• f  .  .  •  M  =  0.1337  MGE  +  0.1598  MJA  +  0.70364  Mus 
pf  =  0.1337  PGE  +  0.1598  •  PJA  +  0.70364  Pus 
~f  =  Mf  -
.f  p 
*  for  the  US,  JA,  GE: 
Rest  of  the  world  real  money  growth  (mf)  is  the  weighted  average  of  the 
money  growth  in  the  other  two  countries,  minus  the  weighted  average  of 
inflation  in  those  two  countrie_s  lagged  ~ne  y~.r--.--21-
weights  of~~  us  JAPAN  GE 
'  GE  I 
0.4555  0.1591 
JA  I 
0.5445  0.1844 
us  I 
0.8409  0.8156 
Total  1. 00  1.  00  1 • 00 
For  us 
Mr  .  • 
=  0.4555  MGE  +  0.5445  MJA 
pf  .  . 
=  0.4555  PGE  +  0.5445  PJA 
~f  =  Mr  - pf 
For  JA 
Mr  .  . 
=  0.1591  MGE  +  0.8409  Mus 
pf  . 
=  0.1591  PGE  +  0.8409  pus 
~f  =  Mr  - •  f 
p 
For  GE 
Mr  '  . 
=  0.1844  MJA  +  0.8156  Mus 
pf  •  •  =  0.1844  PJA  +  0.8156  Pus 
ffir  =  Mf  - pf -22-
2.  Budget  balance  variables 
* 
* 
* 
* 
The  budget  balance  for  the  rest  of  the  world  was  calculated  using  the 
same  weights  as  for  real  money  of  the  rest  of  the  world. 
for  IT,  NL,  UK,  FR,  DK: 
DF f  =  0.1337DFGE  +  0.159BDFJA  +  o.7D364DFus 
for  the  US: 
DF f  =  0.4555DFGE  +  0.5445DFJA 
for  JA: 
oFf  =  0.1591DFGE  +  O.B409DFus 
for  GE: 
DF f  =  0.1844DFJA  +  O.B156DFus -23-
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Footnotes 
(1)  One  should  be  careful,  however,  in  inferring  from  the  insignificance  of 
this  coefficient  that  monetary  policy  had  no  systematic  effect  on  the 
growth  of  real  GOP  in  the  US.  First  there  is  multicollinearity  between 
the  rate  of  change  of  real  wages,  the  unadjusted  budget  surplus  and  the 
rate  of  change  of  the  real  monetary  base.  Second  the  monetary  base  may 
not  have  been  the  aggregate  which  best  reflected  the  degree  of 
stringency  or  ease  of  monetary  policy  in  the  United  States. 
(2)  In  regression  5  of  Table  1  the  coefficient  of  DF(-1)  is  -2.92  and  the 
coefficient  of~F is  +0.41;  -2.92DF(-1)  +  0.41bDF  can  be  rewritten  as: 
0.41DF-(2.98  +  0.41)DF(-1)  or  0.41DF- 3.33DF(-1). -26-
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